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"Without Virtue There Can
Be No Liberty"
Suzanna Sherry*
As the first Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties law, it is fitting that my inaugural lecture will
focus on rights and liberties. Still, as Jeremiah Atwater, the
first President of Middlebury College, said to the assembled Ver-
mont legislature in 1801: "Liberty is a sound dear to us all: But
what do we understand by it?" 1 Over the past two and a quarter
centuries, Americans have understood rights and liberties in a
variety of different ways. What I hope to do in this essay is to
describe the two most prominent traditions of our heritage of
liberty, and then to explore a way in which we might reconcile
the conflicts between them and make both traditions useful in
the service of liberty today.
We should begin with the beginning of American liberty, in
1776. The late eighteenth century was a time of great political
and philosophical ferment, all over the Western world but espe-
cially in the new American states. Overthrowing a monarch was
but the most extreme example of the antipatriarchal trend of the
times. Longstanding hierarchical relationships-between par-
ents and children, masters and servants, governors and gov-
erned-were being transformed. The bonds of birth and blood
were dissolving, and with them went the security of carefully
confined roles in which every player knew his part. The massive
social transformation could be seen on every level, from family
portraits in which fathers-who had always been portrayed
standing above a seated family-were now shown on the same
* Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, Uni-
versity of Minnesota. This essay is a footnoted and slightly edited version of a
lecture given on March 18, 1993, to inaugurate the Earl R. Larson Professor-
ship of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law at the University of Minnesota Law
School.
1. Jeremiah Atwater, A Sermon (Middlebury, Vermont, 1801), in 2 AsmRi-
CAN POLITICAL WRITING DuRING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805, at 1170, 1172
(Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983).
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plane as their wives and children,2 to the widespread demand
that merit and talent should replace birthright, illustrated by
Thomas Paine's revolutionary claim that "[v]irtue is not heredi-
tary."3 The Declaration of Independence and the war that ac-
companied it not only severed American ties to England, but
also served to crystallize and highlight the ongoing social revolu-
tion. There was no turning back.
Sudden freedom from the almost instinctive constraints
that had governed society for centuries, however, left the
fledgling United States in need of substitutes. Freedom too eas-
ily degenerated into what eighteenth century thinkers called li-
cense or licentiousness, which threatened the very existence of a
nation. Atwater reminded the Vermont legislature that
"[1liberty, if considered as a blessing, must be taken in a quali-
fied sense. The freedom which it implies must be a limited, not
[an] absolute freedom.., for the very idea of government always
supposes some restraint."4 John Locke, one of the inspirations
for the American experiment with republican government, wrote
that "[f~reedom... is not... [a] liberty for every one to do what
he lists, [or] to live as he pleases." 5 Benjamin Rush, a noted
Philadelphia doctor and educator, commented in 1787: "In our
opposition to monarchy, we forgot that the temple of tyranny
has two doors. We bolted one of them by proper restraints; but
we left the other open, by neglecting to guard against the effects
of our own ignorance and licentiousness." 6 Licentiousness
sapped the economic and political strength of the nation, leaving
2. JAY FLIEGELMAN, PRODIGALS AND PILGRIMS: THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION AGAINST PATRIARCHAL AUTHoRnY, 1750-1800, at 10 (1982).
3. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 181
(1992); see also id. at 176-180 (describing how wealth became insignificant as
virtue prevailed among Revolutionaries). Algernon Sidney made the same
point: "Virtues are not entail'd." Algernon Sidney, Discourses, II:26, at 373,
quoted in ALAN C. HOUSTON, ALGERNON SIDNEY AND THm REPUBLICAN HERITAGE
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 177 (1991). For similar descriptions of anti-elitist
views, see Jack N. Rakove, "How Else Could It End?": Bernard Bailyn and
the Problem of Authority in Early America, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF EARLY
AMERICAN HISTORY: SOCIETY, AUTHoRTY, AND IDEOLOGY 51, 61 (James
Henretta, Michael Kammen, & Stanley Katz, eds., 1991) [hereinafter TRANS-
FORMATION]; Pauline Maier, The Transforming Impact of Independence, Reaf-
firmed: 1776 and the Definition of American Social Structure, in
TRANSFORMATION, supra at 194, 194. On the collapse of coherent social theory,
see Joyce Appleby, The American Heritage: The Heirs and the Disinherited, 74
J. AM. HisT. 798, 802 (1992).
4. Atwater, supra note 1 at 1172.
5. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GovE Rmv=T 301-02 (Peter Laslett ed.,
critical ed. 1960) (3d ed. 1698).
6. Benjamin Rush, An Address (1787), quoted in FORRSsT McDONALD,
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its people too weak and dissolute to repel corruption from within
or invaders from without. Early Americans discovered that too
much liberty could be as dangerous as too little. Thus the great
challenge of the age, one historian has written, "was to make
authority and liberty compatible." 7
Americans facing this challenge could draw on two distinct
philosophical traditions: the doctrine of natural rights and the
tenets of civic republicanism. The first doctrine focused on indi-
vidual liberty and the second on community and responsibility.
Both traditions were firmly entrenched in American conscious-
ness by the late eighteenth century, and each had a substantial
influence on the founding era. Nevertheless, there is significant
conflict between these two strands of our heritage.
I would like to do three things in this essay. First, I will
briefly describe each of the traditions. Then I will suggest that
part of what is wrong in America today stems from the fact that
we have all but lost the ideas of civic republicanism, leaving only
a somewhat distorted heritage of rights. Because of this trend
we are now facing some of the same threats to liberty the Foun-
ders feared. What can we do? What should we do? I will suggest
that providing an education for republican citizenship offers a
way both to revive the lost tradition and to reconcile the conflict-
ing elements of the two traditions.
I. NATURAL RIGHTS
When we think of rights today, especially when we mean
rights that are enforceable by the judiciary, we limit ourselves to
those rights granted by the Constitution or particular statutes.
Even the most controversial Supreme Court decisions are ulti-
mately tied to the Constitution, no matter how tendentious or
attenuated the link. Roe v. Wade,8 for example, was premised
on the rather questionable notion that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment includes a right of reproductive
freedom.9 Both those opposing and those favoring the underly-
ing right to reproductive freedom have attacked Roe's rationale
from the moment it was written. Why, then, did the Court find
it necessary to rely on such a vulnerable basis for its ruling?
To any modern observer even casually familiar with Ameri-
Novus 0RDO SECLORUm: THE INTELLECTuAL ORIGINS or THE CONSTITUTION 3
(1986).
7. FLMEGELMAN, supra note 2, at 14.
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. Id. at 153-54.
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can law, the answer is so obvious that asking the question ap-
pears disingenuous or worse. The Court based the right to
reproductive freedom on the Constitutional text because the
Court derives its only authority from the Constitution. The
Court can enforce only those rights it finds in the Constitution;
no other principle will suffice. As one scholar noted, comment-
ing in fact on Roe, "[a] neutral and durable principle may be a
thing of beauty and a joy forever. But if it lacks connection with
any value the Constitution marks as special, it is not a Constitu-
tional principle and the Court has no business imposing it."1o
This positivist view-that the Court must base all of its de-
cisions about rights on the Constitution-is, surprisingly, a rela-
tively recent innovation. For roughly the first seventy-five years
of this country's existence, lawyers and judges routinely relied
on extra-constitutional sources of rights, claiming and enforcing
the unwritten natural rights of mankind.1'
The most famous assertion of natural rights, of course, came
in 1776: Thomas Jefferson claimed for himself and his country
the "unalienable rights" of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
piness." Jefferson's eloquent prose merely echoed not only John
Locke's work of a century earlier, but also the ideas of many
Americans whose names and words we have since forgotten. In
1760, Joseph Fish preached an election sermon in Connecticut
in which he argued that each individual has "a natural, unalien-
able right to think and see for himself." 12 Silas Downer dedi-
cated a "tree of liberty" in 1768 by referring to natural rights as
those which "no creature can give, or hath a right to take
away." 13 Alexander Hamilton, whose name we have not forgot-
ten, but with whom we usually do not associate grandiloquent
claims of natural right, discouraged his fellow lawyers from rely-
ing solely on written constitutions. "The sacred rights of man-
kind," he wrote in 1775, "are not to be rummaged for, among old
10. John Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf- A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 949 (1973).
11. For a more detailed discussion of the founding generation's view of nat-
ural rights, see Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. Rlv.
171 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, The Ninth Amendment: Righting an Unwritten
Constitution, 64 CH.-KENT L. REv. 1001 (1989); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders'
Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127 (1987).
12. Joseph Fish, Election Sermon (1760), quoted in STEVEN M. DwoRmrz,
THE UNVARNISHED DocmN: LocxE, LIBERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 177 (1990).
13. Silas Downer, A Discourse at the Dedication of the Tree of Liberty
(1768), in 1 AMEIcAN PoUTicAL WRrriNG DURING mHE FoUNDING ERA, supra
note 1 at 97, 100.
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parchments, or musty records. They are written, as with a sun
beam, in the whole volume of human nature... and can never
be erased or obscured by mortal power." 14 In state after state,
draftsmen laboring over new state constitutions included lan-
guage referring to "natural," "inherent," "essential," or "inalien-
able" rights, and to "the common rights of mankind."15
Eighteenth century Americans passionately believed that
their most important liberties came not from written bills of
rights but from unwritten natural law. Indeed, opponents of the
federal bill of rights argued that listing rights in the federal con-
stitution would be dangerous because it might be construed to
limit pre-existing natural rights. James Iredell told the North
Carolina ratifying convention:
[Ilt would be not only useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a number
of rights which are not intended to be given up; because it would be
implying, in the strongest manner, that every right not included in the
exception might be impaired by the government without usurpa-
tion.... Let any one make what collection or enumeration of rights he
pleases, I will immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not
contained in it.1 6
James Madison in Virginia and James Wilson in Pennsylvania
made identical arguments.' 7 Madison eventually solved the
problem by including the Ninth Amendment in the Bill of
Rights.
Those readers who are frantically trying to recall what the
Ninth Amendment says are not alone: the Supreme Court has
never decided a case on the basis of the Ninth, no constitutional
law casebook included any real discussion of it until early in
1993,18 and it is most often lumped with the Second, Third, and
Tenth as one of those amendments that doesn't mean anything
today. Robert Bork called it an "inkblot," likening it to the
drafters accidentally spilling ink on the text.' 9 It states "[tihe
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." 20
14. Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted &c, in 1 THE PAPERS OF AL-
EXANDER HAMILTON 81, 122 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961).
15. Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, supra note 11 at 1133.
16. JONATHAN ELLIOT, 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE
GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 167 (2d ed. 1891).
17. 3 id. at 626-27; 2 id. at 436.
18. DANIEL A. FARBER, WmLIAm N. ESKRIDGE, & PInP P. FMcEY, CASES
AND MATERIALs ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: THEMES FOR THE CoNsToTTON'S
THIRD CENTURY 499-503 (1993).
19. The Bork Disinformers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1987, at A22.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
1993]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
That we so easily overlook this Amendment, with its obvious
natural law heritage, is evidence of how far removed we are from
the Framers' vision of natural rights.
Between the mid-1700s and the mid-1800s, American
statesmen, politicians, clergy, and ordinary citizens could hardly
utter the word rights without saying or meaning inalienable
natural rights. This language was not mere rhetoric. Beginning
in the 1780s, even before the advent of the federal constitution,
state courts began enforcing unwritten natural rights. A New
York court in 1784 agreed with Alexander Hamilton's argument
that "statutes against law and reason are void."21 The Court
held that an American patriot could not sue the British citizen
who occupied her home during the British occupation of New
York City, despite a state trespass statute that purported to al-
low the suit, and despite the absence of any relevant provision in
the written constitution. 22 In 1786 a Rhode Island court en-
forced a right to trial by jury, even though no such right was
listed in the Rhode Island Constitution. 23 So it continued, in
state after state, right through the first half of the nineteenth
century.
Between 1780 and 1840, courts in every state repeatedly in-
validated laws that violated no provision of the written constitu-
tion. Instead, state court judges relied on such extra-textual
sources of law as "principles of natural justice," 24 "natural
right and justice,"25 "common right and common reason,"26
"fundamental principle[s] of civilized society,"27 "the rights of
the subject,"28 and "the first principles of civil liberty and natu-
21. Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. City Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in Ju-
LIUS GOEBEL, THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DocUMENTS AND
COMENTrrARY 393-419 (1964).
22. Id.
23. Trevett v. Weeden (Newport Sup. Ct. Judicature 1786), described in
JAMES MrrcHELL VARNuM, THE CASE, TREvETr AGAINST WEEDEN: ON INFORMA-
TION AND COMPLAINT, FOR REFUSING PAPER BILLS IN PAYMENT FOR BUTcHER's
MEAT, IN MARKET, AT PAR WITH SPECIE (1787). For further discussion of the
case, see Wayne D. Moore, Written and Unwritten Consitutional Law in the
Founding Period: The Early New Jersey Cases, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 341
(1990).
24. Elliot's Ex'r v. Lyell, 7 Va. (3 Call.) 268, 284 (1802) (Lyons, J.,
concurring).
25. Bradshaw v. Rodgers, 20 Johns. 103, 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822), rev'd on
other grounds, 20 Johns. 735 (N.Y. 1823).
26. Ham v. M'Claws, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay.) 93, 96 (1789).
27. Coates v. The Mayor, 7 Cow. 585, 606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).
28. Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 244, 269 .(1819).
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ral justice." 29 In 1809, Judge Spencer Roane of Virginia
thundered at a lawyer who dared suggest that the Virginia
Supreme Court had no constitutional authority "to declare a law
void as being morally wrong":
It was argued by a respectable member of the bar, that the legislature
had a right to pass any law, however just, or unjust, reasonable, or
unreasonable. This is a position which even the courtly" Judge Black-
stone was scarcely hardy enough to contend for, under the doctrine of
the boasted omnipotence of parliament. What is this, but to lay pros-
trate, at the footstool of the legislature, all our rights of person and
property, and abandon those great objects, for the protection of which,
alone, all free governments have been instituted?30
Nor was the United States Supreme Court content to rely
solely on the Constitution where individual rights were at stake.
Chief Justice Marshall wrote that laws must be measured
against "certain great principles of justice, whose authority is
universally acknowledged," and proceeded to invalidate a law
that violated "general principles which are common to our free
institutions."3 ' Justice Story invalidated a law because it vio-
lated, he said, "natural justice," "the common sense of man-
kind," and "the principles of civil right."32 Similarly, Justice
Chase wrote that the legislature cannot "authorize manifest in-
justice by positive law," whether or not the written Constitution
prohibits the injustice.33 Justice Paterson held the legislature
accountable to "the principles of justice and policy," "the dic-
tates of the moral sense" and "right reason and natural eq-
uity."34 I have quoted all of this language to convey that the
concept of judicially enforceable unwritten natural rights, which
we today find so foreign, was taken for granted by Americans of
the founding generation, especially those trained in the law.
The unwritten rights protected or claimed by the founding
generation ranged from the majestic to the mundane, from the
trivial to the terrible. Trial by jury, protection from ex post facto
laws, and the right to compensation for the taking of property
were all enforced even in the absence of written constitutional
protections. One illustration of the breadth of natural rights
comes from a speech in Congress during the drafting of the fed-
29. Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396, 405 (1814).
30. Currie's Adm'rs v. Mutual Assurance Soc'y, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 315,
341, 346-47 (1809).
31. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133, 139 (1810).
32. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 50-52 (1815).
33. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
34. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 255 (1796) (opinion of Paterson,
1993]
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eral bill of rights. Representative Sedgewick scorned the idea
that a bill of rights could ever be a comprehensive listing of
human rights: if that was what the drafters intended, he said,
"they might have declared that a man should have a right to
wear his hat if he pleased; that he might get up when he
pleased, and go to bed when he thought proper." 35 A Massachu-
setts miscreant claimed "a right to visit all the [w]hore-houses"
in Boston.3 6 In 1789, a South Carolina court enforced a right to
bring slaves into the state despite a newly enacted statute
prohibiting their importation.37 Whether appalling or amusing,
the list of potentially protected rights was not limited to those
enumerated in the various state and federal constitutions.
II. CIVIC VIRTUE
If the idea of natural rights makes us uncomfortable today,
the other aspect of our heritage of liberty, civic virtue, is even
harder for us to comprehend. Eighteenth century Americans be-
lieved that their experiment with liberty would stand or fall on
the civic virtue of the citizenry. What did they mean by civic
virtue? I will give a more expansive definition later, but for now
let it evoke a general picture of citizens who are willing and able
to participate in the public life of their community and their
nation.
The quotation that forms my title today, "without virtue
there can be no liberty," is from a 1786 speech by Benjamin
Rush,38 but it is just one formulation of an idea that was com-
mon to virtually every American in the founding era. Samuel
Adams wrote that men "will be free no longer than while they
remain virtuous."39 His cousin and political opposite, John Ad-
ams, said that "public Virtue is the only Foundation of Repub-
lics." 40 An anonymous opponent of the Constitution wrote that
a "free government, can only exist where the body of the people
35. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759-60 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1834).
36. WILLIAm E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COIvMON LAW: THE IM-
PACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETrS SoCIEY, 1760-1830, at 89-90
(1975).
37. Ham v. M'Claws, 1 S.C.L. (I Bay.) 93 (1789).
38. Benjamin Rush, Thoughts Upon The Mode of Education Proper in a
Republic (1786), in EssAYs ON EDUCATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 9, 10 (Freder-
ick Rudolph ed., 1965).
39. Letter from Samuel Adams to John Scollay (Dec. 30, 1780), in 4 THE
W rTINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMs 236, 238 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., 1908).
40. Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren (April 16, 1776), in 1 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTrruTIoN 670 (Philip Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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are virtuous." 41 Another commented that "[a] virtuous people
make just laws, and good laws tend to preserve unchanged a vir-
tuous people." 42 All these thinkers, and many others, rested
their hopes for America largely on the character of its people:
neither written constitutions nor unwritten rights, neither gov-
ernments nor armies, could save a nation whose people would
not save themselves.
In their reliance on virtue, the founding generation looked
to a classical tradition that stretched back through seventeenth
century English Whigs to Machiavelli and ultimately to Aris-
totle. According to this tradition, "man was by nature a political
being, a citizen who achieved his greatest moral fulfillment by
participating in a self-governing republic." 43 Civic virtue was
the highest reflection of humankind's political or communitarian
nature. To be unvirtuous was to fail to flourish, to be less than
human.
Today, we can barely understand this concept of civic virtue.
One of my colleagues snickered when he first heard the title of
this speech; he assumed that "virtue" was used in its predomi-
nant modern sense of sexual chastity. In the eighteenth cen-
tury, however, "virtue" meant something quite different.
When eighteenth century Americans spoke of virtue, they
invoked several intertwined ideas, all of which stemmed from
the classical tradition of political participation as the highest
human good. Responsibility, independence and community
spirit are some of the modern concepts that come closest to cap-
turing the meaning of civic virtue. A virtuous citizen had an in-
dependent mind and a willingness to use it for the good of the
community. Virtue meant taking responsibility for oneself and
one's community. Virtue also meant letting reason control pas-
sion, letting long-term community interests override selfish indi-
vidual wants. Citizens in a virtuous republic deliberated
rationally about what would best serve the interests of the
community.
These appeals to reasoned argument and to individual re-
sponsibility make clear how liberty is at the mercy of virtue.
Without reasoned argument, government can only rule through
41. Letters of Centinel I. (Oct. 5, 1787), in 2 THE CoMiLET ANI-FEDERAI,
IST 130, 139 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
42. Letters from the Federal Farmer VII., in 2 THE ComPLETE ANTI-FEDER-
ALIST, supra note 41, at 266.
43. Gordon S. Wood, Classical Republicanism and the American Revolu-
tion, 66 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 13, 23 (1990).
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either raw power or deceptive rhetoric, what one scholar has
called "strategic arguments designed to persuade by their emo-
tional effect on the listener."4 When coerced by force or
manipulated by their emotions, a people are no longer free.
Moreover, irresponsible citizens cannot participate effectively in
a democratic republic. As one modern scholar has put it,
"[t]hose who are free of responsibility for themselves cannot be
free to make their own way in society."45
For the founding generation, one of the consequences of bas-
ing a republic on virtue was a kind of rough egalitarianism. A
virtuous citizen worked hard, and a virtuous nation rewarded
work, talent, and merit rather than accidents of birth. The his-
torian Gordon Wood has described the new republic as adopting
"achieved rather than ascribed standards of aristocracy." 46
Thus, John Smilie could say that "[a] virtuous man, be his situa-
tion what it may, is respectable." 47 Unlike the hierarchical so-
cial structure of England, in America even those in poverty
could be respected and achieve full citizenship, if they were
virtuous.
Although liberty as virtue could assist the cause of equality,
liberty as natural rights could hinder that cause, as in the case I
noted earlier about the natural right to import slaves. The ten-
sion between liberty and equality that still plagues us today
thus has very deep roots. Where we struggle with the conflict
between free speech and hate speech, the framers struggled with
the conflict between the slaveowners' right to property and the
slaves' right to liberty. I am not suggesting that the two are
commensurate, or even that they should necessarily be resolved
in the same way, only that both examples illustrate the same
tension. Incidentally, today we usually take "civil rights" to
mean equality, and "civil liberties" to mean liberty, so there is
some irony (as well as great pride and pleasure) in holding a
chair in both Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, because the
two can be in such great tension.
Equality is just one example of the tension between the idea
44. Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86
MICH. L. REv. 1835, 1846 (1988).
45. LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTrLEmNT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS
OF CITIZENSHIP 43 (1986).
46. WOOD, supra note 3, at 196.
47. Pauline Maier, The Transforming Impact of Independence, Reaffirmed:
1776 and the Definition of American Social Structure, in THE TRANSFORMATION
OF EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: SOCIETY, AUTHoRITY, AND IDEOLOGY 194, 211
(James A. Henretta et al. eds., 1991) (quoting John Smilie).
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of civic virtue and the idea of natural rights. When the good of
the community comes into conflict with individual desire, so too
do the two traditions. A republic founded on virtue seeks to cul-
tivate and improve humanity, while a republic founded on rights
seeks to gratify its citizens' desires. Anyone with children
knows that the two goals are often mutually incompatible. But,
as my mother-in-law reminds me, we are not good parents if we
simply make our children happy without helping them become
autonomous and independent, and so it is with a nation that
gratifies desires with no regard for the character of its citizens.
The founding generation avoided the consequences of this
conflict in several ways.48 They generally failed to recognize the
conflict, because they believed that only "idiots or self-murder-
ers" would put their own selfish interests ahead of the interests
of the community.49 Moreover, many of their most cherished
rights were viewed as collective rights, serving civic or commu-
nal purposes. Trial by jury, religious freedom and protection for
robust and uninhibited debate on public matters all strength-
ened and encouraged a virtuous, responsible, and deliberative
citizenry. Even the right to property, which we would consider a
paradigmatic individual right against the community, was
viewed differently by the founding generation. The ideal virtu-
ous citizen was independent, responsible for himself and be-
holden to no one for his livelihood, and thus ought to own land.
Land ownership both allowed citizens to cultivate virtue and in-
dependence, and tied them to their communities.
The fact that we, today, view property as a right against the
state rather than as a way of cultivating virtue and community
spirit begins to suggest just how far we have strayed from our
dual heritage of rights and virtue. Other examples abound. One
legal scholar-writing in a prestigious law review-recently at-
tacked welfare reform that encourages family responsibility by
giving incentives to parents to marry, to limit the number of
children they have, to keep their children in school, to pay rent
and to get available medical care for the children.50 She says
such reforms are nothing but foisting "majoritarian middle-class
48. This paragraph synopsizes Suzanna Sherry, The Intellectual Origins of
the Constitution: A Lawyers' Guide to Contemporary Historical Scholarship, 5
CONST. CoMMENTARY 323 (1988).
49. Letter from John Sullivan to Meshech Weare (Dec. 11, 1775), in 4th
Ser., IV., AmERICAN ARcmvEs 242 (Force ed., 1775), quoted in GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AAMERICAN REPuBc, 1776-1787, at 56 (1969).
50. Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Wel-
fare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 720-21 (1992).
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values" on welfare recipients. 51 A well-respected scholar has
written an entire book expanding on the notion that equal citi-
zenship means that "[elach individual is . . . entitled to be
treated by... society as a... responsible... member," without
a word about whether citizens ought to behave responsibly.5 2 A
woman who starved her 13-week-old baby to death by deliber-
ately failing to feed him claimed that she should be absolved of
any responsibility because she herself was a victim of abuse.53
A brewery worker sought compensation from his employer for
the alcoholism he allegedly incurred from drinking its free
beer.54 Some legal scholars argue that people and corporations
are entitled to compensation when the state prohibits them from
using their property in ways that damage the environment.55 I
could go on and on, but I think the point is clear: everyone
claims rights, but no one accepts responsibility.
A subtle form of this abandonment of responsibility may un-
derlie some of the current demand for "multiculturalism." The
Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor has recently published a
very persuasive essay suggesting that we ought to presume that
any culture that has "animated whole societies over some con-
siderable stretch of time [has] something important to say to all
human beings." 56 Anything less, he notes, would take "supreme
arrogance." 57 I agree that we should be open to, and willing to
learn from, other cultures. I also agree, however, with Taylor's
further insight: he recognizes that many proposals to create
51. Id. One response to this is to ask by whose values ought we judge wel-
fare recipients? "Certainly not those of a teenager who, by having a child out of
wedlock-with no means to support it and largely unprepared to care for it-
has already demonstrated that she does not make responsible decisions."
Douglas Besharov, The Moral Voice of Welfare Reform, 3 THE RESPONSIVE COM-
MUNTY: RIGHTS AND REsPoNsmmrrI s 13, 18 (1993).
52. KENNETH KARST, BELONGING To AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION 3 (1989). The book does talk about responsibility but only in the
context of urging national responsibility to and for various "marginalized"
groups, never in the context of those groups' own possible responsibility for
their marginalized status. See, e.g., id. at 125, 148, 166-67.
53. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Battered Reason, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 5,
1992, at 25, 28.
54. See CHARLES J. SYKES, A NATION OF VICTIMS: THE DECAY OF THE AMER-
ICAN CHARACTER.126-27 (1992).
55. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A
Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1369 (1993) (taking issue with
holding that compensation under the Takings Clause due only if land use re-
striction deprives owner of "all economically beneficial uses" of property).
56. CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM AND "THE POLITICS OF RECOGNI-
TION" 66 (1992).
57. Id. at 73.
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Afrocentric curricula or to purge the "canon" of Eurocentric in-
fluences are essentially demands for much more than this. They
are essentially demands that we not only acknowledge "the
equal value of all humans potentially" but also "the equal value
of what they have made of this potential in fact."58 In other
words, some multiculturalists want us to value, not just tolerate
or respect, but value each individual and every culture equally,
regardless of the extent to which they have lived up to their po-
tential or created anything worthwhile. The right to automatic
recognition supplants the responsibility to develop our human
potential or to be accountable for not doing so.
In letting rights overwhelm virtue we have done more harm
than simply letting people get something for nothing. We also
give them nothing and call it something. A poor and pregnant
woman has a "right" to an abortion, but no resources with which
to turn her life around whether or not she chooses to have the
child.59 School children have a "right" to an integrated educa-
tion, but not to an adequate one. Working women have a "right"
to a job, but no way to keep it if family obligations prevent them
from imitating the workaholic tendencies of their free male col-
leagues.60 We have the "right" to vote, but decreasing numbers
feel any duty to do so at all, let alone in an informed manner.
We have, indubitably, lost our virtue. In our haste to pro-
tect rights, we have lost the language of individual responsibil-
ity. One modern scholar summarizes the situation by noting the
proliferation of claims of right, to "trees, animals, smokers, non-
smokers, consumers, and so on,"61 and lamenting the fact that
talk of rights is "the language of no compromise.... [tihe win-
ner takes all and the loser has to get out of town." 62 Another
writer cites the failure of welfare programs to reduce or elimi-
nate poverty among the underclass as a consequence of remov-
58. Id. at 42-43; see also id. at 64-68 (discussing multicultural curricula as
a process of revising the images of dominated groups in society). Other scholars
have noted another problem with modern multiculturalists in that they seem to
deny the possibility of any shared culture: "contemporary multiculturalism is
the same tribalism that divides Serbs from Croats or Bosnians, Armenians from
Azeris, and Arabs from Kurds." Paul D. Carrington, Diversity! 4 UTAH L. REv.
1105, 1111 (1992).
59. See MARY ANN GIENDON, RIorrs TAXX: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
PoLrrIcAL DiscOURSE 65-6 (1991) (comparing the abortion policies of United
States and West Germany).
60. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Work-
place, 32 ARIZ. L. REv. 431, 432 (1990); Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless
Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1559, 1594-1608 (1991).
61. GLENDON, supra note 59, at xi.
62. Id. at 9.
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ing from welfare policy any concept of individual
responsibility.63 He notes that because welfare payments are
entitlements that have traditionally demanded nothing from re-
cipients in return, "dependent groups are shielded from the
pressures to function well that impinge on other Americans." 64
We have elevated rights at the expense of both individual
and community responsibility, and as the trend continues, it es-
calates. More and more absolute rights clash with one another.
And if Benjamin Rush is right, having lost our virtue, we are
now in danger of losing our liberty.
Why we have kept our rights but lost our virtue is not an
easy question to answer, and I want to make only a tentative
suggestion here. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, positivism invaded American law and jurisprudence. In
its purest form, legal positivism defines law as only whatever is
enacted by the relevant authority. Law is positively enacted leg-
islation, written constitutions, and judicial decisions directly de-
rivable from those sources. All other sources of law are
irrelevant and illegitimate, including both natural rights and as-
pirations to human virtue. Others have thoroughly explored the
causes of the rise of positivism, which may include the abolition-
ist movement and the Civil War, the rise of professionalism
among lawyers, and the attraction of a scientific model of law.
65
Positivism is alluring, for, as Oliver Wendell Holmes has sug-
gested, it gives us "the illusion of certainty which makes legal
reasoning seem like mathematics." 66 For our purposes, how-
ever, it is enough to note that positivism did arise, and that it
triumphed over older forms of legal reasoning.
When eighteenth century ideas of natural rights and civic
virtue clashed with nineteenth century positivism, positivism
won. It defeated the tradition of natural rights by stripping
rights of their transcendent character: natural rights were
transformed into constitutional rights and thus limited to what
63. MEAD, supra note 45.
64. Id. at 2.
65. For one explanation, see ROBERT FERGUSON, LAw & LETTERS IN AMERI-
CAN CuLTuRE 199-202 (1984).
66. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv. L.
Rlv. 1, 7 (1894). For more detail on Holmes and positivism, see Morten J. Hor-
witz, The Place of Justice Holmes in American Legal Thought, in THE LEGACY
OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs, JR. 31 (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992); Eben
Moglen, The Transformation of Morton Horwitz, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1042, 1050-
53 (1993) (reviewing MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERicAN
LAW, 1870-1960: THE Cmisis OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992)).
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was written. As I suggested earlier, courts now enforce only
those rights which they can find in the Constitution.
Positivism, however, could not similarly transform the idea
of virtue, because one cannot force a man to be virtuous by law
or legislate a community into existence.6 7 Virtue has to be de-
sired and chosen or it becomes simply what one scholar has
called "civic continence." 68 A community springs from the
hearts of its members, not from the minds of its legislature. The
positivist version of natural rights is constitutional rights, but
there is no such thing as a positivist version of virtue. Moreover,
it is difficult for positivism and theories of virtue to coexist be-
cause they are essentially alternative explanations for what
makes a law right and good and just. So while the spread of
positivism could leave something of our heritage of rights, it
could only abandon the heritage of virtue.
Ill. RIGHTS AND VIRTUE
If there is any question more difficult to answer than why
we have sacrificed half our heritage of liberty, it is what we can
do about it. Nevertheless, having offered such a pessimistic as-
sessment of our current state, I would be acting irresponsibly if I
failed to offer some solution.
Let me reiterate what we need: we need a way to reinvigo-
rate virtue, and also to reconcile it with the idea of rights. One
way to do this is to argue that we, as citizens, have a right to the
maximum development of our virtues. As philosopher Martha
Nussbaum has noted, "if you have a person on your hands who
is a citizen with the basic capabilities to become virtuous, this
exerts a claim on the lawgiver that those abilities should be de-
veloped." 69 The development of the capacity to be virtuous,
however, is a daunting task in modern America. An apathetic
and ifl-prepared citizenry barely exercises its right to vote and
devotes far more time to watching televised sports than to learn-
ing what the government is doing. Where do we start?
We are not the first to struggle with the dilemma of how to
create a virtuous populace. The Founders knew that civic virtue
67. For an illustration of this idea, see Suzanna Sherry, Speaking of Virtue:
A Republican Approach to University Regulation of Hate Speech, 75 MINN. L.
REv. 933 (1991).
68. Lawrence B. Solum, Virtues and Voices, 66 Cm.-KEr L. REv. 111, 118
(1990).
69. Martha C. Nussbaum, Comments, 66 CIn.-KENr L. REv. 213, 233
(1990).
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did not spring unbidden from the human heart, but needed care-
ful nurturing. With some allowance for the changes of the last
two centuries, my proposal is the same as theirs: education.
70
In the eighteenth century, writer after writer-politicians,
clergy, educators, and anyone else interested in the future of the
nation-stressed the necessity of education to the maintenance
of virtue and hence of liberty. Moses Mather declared in 1775
that "[t]he strength and spring of every free government is the
virtue of the people; virtue grows on knowledge, and knowledge
on education." 71 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, one
of many adopted by the various states between 1776 and 1787,
noted that "[w]isdom and knowledge, as well as virtue... [are]
necessary for the preservation of ... rights and liberties."
72
Zabdiel Adams preached in 1782 that "[a]n ignorant people will
never long live under a free government. They will soon become
slaves." 73 An unknown Federalist said in 1787 that "[i] we
would maintain our dear bought rights inviolate, let us diffuse
the spirit of literature." 74 Samuel Knox wrote in 1799 that
"[i]gnorance ... has ever been the parent and stupid nurse of
civil slavery."7 5 Joel Barlow noted in 1801 that "[ilgnorance is
everywhere... an infallible instrument of despotism." 76 My
title, that "without virtue there can be no liberty," comes from a
70. It seems especially appropriate for me to focus on education in my inau-
gural lecture as the Earl R. Larson Professor of Law. Just over 20 years ago,
Judge Larson decided a case that changed the course of public education in
Minneapolis. Acting with great courage, Judge Larson defied public opinion by
permanently enjoining Minneapolis from discriminating on the basis of race or
national origin and requiring Minneapolis to disestablish racially segregated
schools. See Booker v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 351 F. Supp. 799 (1972). He
knew then what I am asserting here: liberty and education are inextricably
linked.
71. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 49, at
120 (quoting Moses Mather).
72. MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. V, § H, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FoRMIG THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 1907 (Francis Thorpe ed., 1909).
73. Zabdiel Adams, An Election Sermon (1782), in 1 AMERIcAN POLITICAL
WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA, supra note 1, at 539, 555.
74. The Worcester Speculator No. VI (1787), in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL
WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA, supra note 1, at 699, 701.
75. Samuel Knox, An Essay On the Best System of Liberal Education
(1799), in ESSAYS ON EDUCATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 38, at 271,
288.
76. Letter II from Joel Barlow [to His Fellow Citizens of the United States:
On Certain Political Measures Proposed to Their Consideration (1801), in 2
AMERICAN POLTICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA, supra note 1, at
1099, 1121.
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pamphlet itself called "Thoughts Upon the Mode of Education
Proper in a Republic." 77
Despite these and numerous other exhortations, education
was an aspiration in 1800, and mostly limited to the privileged
few. Although Noah Webster pointed out the irony of putting
the vote into the hands of "every honest industrious man" while
depriving some of the education necessary to exercise it,78 little
was done to extend educational opportunities to the masses.
In order to reinvigorate virtue, and to reconcile it with our
notions of individual rights, we must establish a right to an edu-
cation. If it seems ironic that I should first lament our modern
preoccupation with rights and then urge establishment of yet
another one, I want to remind the reader that my purpose is not
simply to protect the individual holder of the right but also to
create virtuous citizens. Remember also that our heritage of
natural rights allows us to claim such a right regardless of the
language of the Constitution. If the right requires a constitu-
tional hook, the Ninth Amendment will oblige for the federal
government and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment suffices for the states.79 Moreover,
many state constitutions establish a state duty to provide public
education.
If this new right is to serve the stated purpose of re-inte-
grating the eighteenth century idea of virtue into our national
consciousness, rather than simply adding another entitlement to
the proliferating list, it must be carefully described. I am pro-
posing education for citizenship, not just the education of citi-
zens. It is not simply a right to education per se, or even a right
to the same education for everyone, but a right to an education
77. Rush, supra note 38 at 10. For other similar sentiments, see Akhil
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1208-10 (1991)
(discussing the importance of education to Madison, Jefferson, and others); Rob-
ert H. Horwitz, John Locke and the Preservation of Liberty: A Perennial Prob-
lem of Civic Education, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 136 (Robert H. Horwitz ed., 3d ed. 1986) (describing Locke's influ-
ence); CAROLINE ROBBINs, THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY COMMONWrAi iNr 14,
99-100 (1961) (describing similar Whig influence); Colleen A. Sheehan, The
Politics of Public Opinion: James Madison's "Notes on Government", 49 WM. &
MARY Q. 609, 620-24 (1992) (attributing similar views to Madison); WOOD,
supra note 48, at 120-21 (discussing the 1776 Revolutionary leaders' similar
ideas).
78. Noah Webster, On the Education of Youth in America (1790), in EssAYs
ON EDUCATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 38, at 41, 66.
79. See Susan Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for A Right to Education
Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education
Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 550, 553 (1992).
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that makes one capable of participating as a virtuous republican
citizen. 0 It is therefore both more and less than what the courts
have currently bestowed on us. So before agreeing too quickly
with my proposal, the reader should understand what it means.
In this essay I will only sketch the outlines of an education
for civic virtue, and how it might change the way we think about
education. I will leave for a later article the details of how my
proposal might affect existing education law: issues that range
from ftmding options to the limits of free speech in school, from
integration to religious freedom. Although the Supreme Court
often mentions democratic citizenship as one goal of education,8 '
there has been little or no systematic exploration of what an ed-
ucation for citizenship might look like. This essay is a prelimi-
nary sketch of just such an educational system.
First, you will be happy to know that I do not propose the
education that Samuel Knox suggested for American youth in
1799, which included comprehensive knowledge of the following:
the English, French, Latin, and Greek languages, Greek and Roman
antiquities, ancient and modern geography, universal grammar, belles-
lettres, rhetoric, and composition, chronology and history, the princi-
ples of ethics, law, and government, the various branches of the mathe-
matics and the sciences founded on them, astronomy, natural and
experimental philosophy.... [and] the ornamental accomplishments
[of] drawing, painting, fencing, and music.8 2
The course I propose might strike some as equally difficult,
however, because it requires students or, in the case of younger
students, their parents, to take some responsibility for their own
education. The union of rights and virtue means that although
it is the responsibility of the polity to provide the opportunity for
an education for citizenship, it is the responsibility of the indi-
vidual to take advantage of it. As modern Kantian philosopher
Richard Eldridge noted, it is "a commandment of morality that
we must develop our faculties rather than occupy ourselves with
idle amusements." 3 Giving people responsibility is also a way
80. For similar suggestions, see Amy GuTmA, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 39
(1987); Horwitz, supra note 77, at 152 (noting Locke's radical ideas for educa-
tional reform); Stephen E. Gottlieb, In the Name of Patriotism: The Constitu-
tionality of "Bending" History in Public Secondary Schools, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv.
497 (1987) (discussing indoctrination common in our secondary schools and its
failure to prepare students for citizenship).
81. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986);
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982).
82. Samuel Knox, An Essay on the Best System of Liberal Education (1799),
in EssAYs ON EDUCATION IN THE EARLY REpuBLIc, supra note 38, at 271, 315.
83. RICMHARD ELDRIDGE, ON MORAL PERSONHOOD: PHILOSOPHY, LTERATURE,
CRITICISM, AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING 44 (1989).
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of educating them to virtue, for the exercise of choices helps de-
velop the capacity to choose wisely.8 4
Again, I am only adapting to modern needs something
Americans recognized when virtue and rights still coexisted.
Joel Barlow wrote in 1792, "[bly discovering to a man his rights,
you impose upon him a new system of duties."8 5 Samuel Harri-
son Smith, an eighteenth-century educator and publisher, noted
"the obligation of everyone to enlarge the powers of his mind."8 6
The -substance of my proposed education for citizenship
might also be controversial. Education must ultimately produce
adults who are both willing and able to deliberate rationally
about the public good. It must therefore encourage both the ca-
pacity for independent thought and the inclination and courage
to use education for the good of the community.87 To achieve
these goals, education must do two things: it must give children
a sense of their own country's history and culture, and it must
teach them to deliberate critically and rationally.88 Only then
can they function as citizens of their own particular democratic
polity. Without the ability to think critically and rationally,
84. Responsibility may indeed be necessary to such development. See
Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 300 (1988)
("Authentic responsibility can develop only where a person is free to act virtu-
ously or not.").
85. Joel Barlow, A Letter to the National Convention of France on the De-
fects in the Constitution of 1791 (1792), in 2 AMRIcAN POLITICAL WRITING DuR-
ING THE FOUNDING ERA, supra note 1, at 812, 834; see also Paul D. Carrington,
Meaning and Professionalism in American Law, 10 CONST. Co siENTARY (forth-
coming 1993) (ascribing similar view to prominent nineteenth century legal ed-
ucator Francis Lieber).
86. Samuel H. Smith, Remarks on Education: Illustrating the Close Con-
nection Between Virtue and Wisdom (1798), in EssAYs ON EDUCATION IN THE
EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 38, at 167, 178; see also Hendrik Hartog, The Con-
stitution of Aspiration and "The Rights That Belong to Us All," 74 J. Am. HST.
1013, 1019 (1987) ("One was obliged then to become an autonomous citizen, so
that one could participate usefully in communities.").
87. This argument is not far from the Enlightenment vision that animated
the founding generation. Immanuel Kant described "'the motto of the
[E]nlightemnent" as "'Have the courage to use your own understanding.'"
FLrEGELMAN, supra note 2, at 3; see also Noah Webster, On The Education of
Youth in America, in EssAYs ON EDUCATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note
38, at 41, 45 ("Systems of education should be adopted... [to] implant in the
minds of the American youth the principles of virtue and of liberty and inspire
them with just and liberal ideas of government and with an inviolable attach-
ment to their own country.").
88. For similar suggestions see GuTmANN, supra note 80, at 38-39; WILLIAm
A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIvERsrTY IN THE LIS-
ERAL STATE 243 (1991) (stating civic education ought to produce "individuals
who can effectively conduct their lives within, and support, their political
community").
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children cannot reach independent judgments, and without any
attachment to their own community they have no reason to act
in its behalf. As one education scholar has noted: "Society must
indoctrinate children so they may be capable of autonomy. They
must be socialized to the norms of society while remaining free
to modify or even abandon those norms."8 9 Again, this idea res-
onates with our particular heritage. One recent scholar has
summarized the influences on early American education as sug-
gesting that "[wlithout rational education there is no indepen-
dence of mind and thus eventually no liberty."90
I suspect that neither liberals nor conservatives will much
like the implications of my proposal. For example, if young chil-
dren have a right to an education for citizenship, and their par-
ents some responsibility for providing it, that means that it is no
longer acceptable to argue against school choice or voucher plans
on the ground that some parents will not exercise the choice
responsibly. Parents have an obligation to prepare their chil-
dren for responsible citizenship in the same way that they have
an obligation to feed them, and an utter failure to do so is plain
and simple parental neglect.
Similarly, the theory of "educational equity"-recently pro-
pounded by some commentators and accepted by at least one
state court9 1-pays insufficient attention to individual responsi-
bility. That theory argues that school districts in a state must
be funded, not just in equal amounts, but so as to ensure equal
outputs. That is, the state should fund students in "disadvan-
taged" districts at a higher level than "advantaged" districts so
that the students will achieve at the same level. 92 Unfortu-
nately, this argument places the entire blame for underachieve-
ment and the entire burden for remedying it on the state,
ignoring the fact that underachieving students sometimes
choose to ignore or reject the same educational opportunities of
89. Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Ortho-
doxy": Value Training in the Public Schools, 1987 ILL. L. REv. 15, 19 (1987).
90. FLIEGELMAN, supra note 2, at 16.
91. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 402-03 (N.J. 1990); Charles S.
Benson, Definitions of Equity in School Finance in Texas, New Jersey, and Ken-
tucky, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 401 (1991); James S. Liebman, Implementing
Brown in the Nineties: Political Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection, and Liti-
gatively Enforced Legislation Reform, 76 VA. L. REv. 349 (1990). Ironically,
studies suggest that "[tihere is no systematic relationship between school ex-
penditures and student performance." Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance
"Reform" May Not Be Good Policy, 28 HAv. J. ON LEGIs. 423, 425 (1991) (em-
phasis omitted).
92. See generally Benson supra note 91; Liebman, supra note 91.
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which their more successful counterparts have taken advantage.
Attention to individual responsibility suggests that the society
need only provide access to education: a failure to take advan-
tage of it "does not generate any additional need claims that so-
ciety is obliged to honor."9 3 Samuel Adams may have been right
when he declared that people who have lost their virtue "are not
worth saving."94
My suggestion that education for citizenship requires teach-
ing students to think critically and rationally is also likely to be
unpopular in some circles. For example, fundamentalist parents
in Tennessee unsuccessfully asked a court to excuse their ele-
mentary school children from required reading classes because
they "did not want [their] children to make critical judgments
and exercise choices in areas where the Bible provides the an-
swer."95 According to my theory, that desire, too, is a form of
parental neglect. One scholar defends that parental neglect on
the ground that "liberal freedom entails the right to live unex-
amined as well as examined lives." 96 Unfortunately, his defini-
tion of liberty is but another example of how we exalt rights at
the expense of virtue. If we leave our own lives unexamined, we
cannot presume to take part in the governance of others.
More broadly, an education in critical thought can put au-
thority and tradition into question. Education for virtue is "not
a mindless habituation, but consists of the critical scrutiny of
beliefs and judgments."97 In the 1960s, there was a slogan that
was common on everything from backpacks to buttons: it said
"Question authority." It used to drive many conservatives wild
back then and I assume it still does, but it is a rough approxima-
tion of some of the implications of my theory of education for
civic virtue. Preparing citizens to participate in their own coun-
try's politics requires instilling in them an attachment to their
country, which in turn implies some respect for tradition, but
93. GALsTON, supra note 88, at 185.
94. Letter from Samuel Adams to John Scollay, in 4 THE WRITINGS OF SA-
MUEL ADAS, supra note 39, at 238.
95. Mozert v. Hawkins, 827 F.2d 1058, 1069 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
96. GALSTON, supra note 88, at 254. For alternative defenses of that ne-
glect, suggesting that religious-based doctrines are a contestable epistemologi-
cal choice that need not conform to reason to qualify as valid and sufficient
education, see Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating
Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUK= L.J. 977 (1987); Nomi M. Stolzenberg, "He
Drew A Circle That Shut Me Out" . Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Para-
dox of A Liberal Education, 106 HARv. L. REv. 581, 582-667 (1993).
97. Nussbaum, supra note 69, at 213, 224.
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respect is not the same as blind obedience. Perhaps the slogan
should be modified: "Question authority, but listen carefully to
its answers." Still, those who want prayer and the pledge of al-
legiance back in the public schools and the flag protected from
burning are unlikely to appreciate a theory of education that en-
courages students to think for themselves.
I do not mean to direct my remarks only to those who have
an opportunity to set educational policy: legislators, judges,
school board members, parents and teachers. I hope my
message of individual responsibility as the only way to reclaim
our republican heritage of liberty will also reach students them-
selves, especially law students, who as mature adults have both
the opportunity and the obligation to participate in their own
education. Law students are not passive receptacles into which
we as teachers pour knowledge, but functioning citizens of the
republic with an obligation to themselves and to everyone else to
make the most of their educational opportunities.
Finally, I hope that I have followed in the footsteps of the
earliest American law teachers, including George Wythe at Wil-
liam and Mary, David Howell at Brown, and Daniel Chipman at
Middlebury. 98 Their mission, according to the foremost modern
scholar of early American legal education, was "to transmit re-
publican virtue to democratic leaders." 99 Because virtue re-
quires education, I hope that these remarks make a contribution
to the education of everyone who heard or reads them. Perhaps
I have better defined rights and liberties: not just freedom to
make choices, but the inclination to make wise choices. 100 Even
if I have not persuaded you of the soundness of my theories,
maybe I have increased your knowledge of American history. At
the very least, I hope I have explained why I am so honored to be
the first Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liber-
ties, and why I cannot imagine myself in any other profession.
98. For documentation, see Paul D. Carrington, The Revolutionary Idea of
University Legal Education, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 527 (1990).
99. Paul D. Carrington, Butterfly Effects: The Possibilities of Law Teach-
ing in A Democracy, 41 DuKE L.J. 741, 757 (1992).
100. See GuTomAN, supra note 80, at 33-41; see also Rogers M. Smith, The
"American Creed" and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in
the United States, 41 W. POL. Q. 225, 247 (1988) ("Freedom should not be un-
derstood to mean simply a lack of hindrance in doing what we will. It means
valuing and exercising our capacities for reflective self-direction and choosing
ways of life that preserve and enhance those capacities for all.").
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